The Bauhaus as Cold-War Legend: West German Modernism Revisited

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By now it is hardly any secret that Bauhaus Modernism, once a highly charismatic teaching philosophy and visual vocabulary, has fallen into serious disfavor over the years. Ever since the late 1960s, denouncing the bad faith informing the Bauhaus program and the apparent hubris of its leading figures has developed into a favorite transatlantic parlor game. For many observers, Tom Wolfe's widely read 1981 satire, *From Bauhaus to Our House,* marked the Bauhaus' final passage from tragedy to farce, as its once noble dreams were mocked in a dark round of laughter and forgetting. Surprisingly little scholarly attention, however, has been devoted to the reasons behind the Bauhaus' remarkable success and especially its canonization in both West Germany and the United States after 1945. Given that it experienced great difficulty throughout the Weimar Republic, was closed down by the Nazis, and forced into a difficult exile in the United States, where its partial reincarnation in Chicago fizzled out after only a few years, this clichéd Bauhaus success story is by no means self-evident. What then accounted for its unrivaled cultural authority after 1945? In this article, I argue that the postwar popularization of the Bauhaus in West Germany and the United States, less a simple function of its own momentum from the 1920s, was shaped to a large extent by the cultural imperatives of the Cold War.

Situating the West German reception of the Bauhaus within its wider political milieu is an attempt to recount the cultural logic informing the postwar revision and celebration of the Bauhaus legacy. The effort to contextualize the Bauhaus is of course nothing new in itself, as numerous architectural historians have deftly shown the degree to which the Bauhaus and Bauhaus historiography (despite seemingly apolitical rhetoric) have always been highly political interventions.[1] Even so, this article tries to take a somewhat different tack, namely to relate the Bauhaus' post-1945 career to the larger Cold War construction of West Germany's cultural identity.[2] To this end, I am interested in grounding the West German reinvention of the Bauhaus saga (and with it the biography of its founder, Walter Gropius) within a broader transatlantic setting in order to explore the ways in which it was used to help underwrite new and

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necessary cultural narratives after 1945. In this period, the Bauhaus assumed a privileged position within West German culture in part because it played a crucial role in the larger Cold War project to draw the Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic into the same elective liberal lineage, while at the same time conjoining West German and American cultural modernism.

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In January 1953, the well-known Cologne architect Rudolf Schwarz was invited by the editors of one of West Germany's leading architectural journals, *Baukunst und Werkform,* to write a contributing essay on the theme "Building and Writing." Since Schwarz had recently served as a key participant in the celebrated 1951 Darmstadt Conference on "People and Space," the editors hoped his piece would help enlarge the current discussion about the problems facing West German architecture and urban design. Schwarz himself welcomed the opportunity to elaborate upon his earlier critique of modernist architecture as a model for post-1945 city planning.[3] But this time he went much further, veering off from the assigned theme in order to challenge what he perceived as the unjustified nimbus of cultural authority surrounding Gropius and the Bauhaus. In his sweeping polemic entitled "Bilde Künstler, Rede Nicht" ("Artists Should Create Not Speak"), Schwarz openly accused Gropius and the Bauhaus of having irrevocably corrupted German architecture and design, whereby the unfolding tragedy of post-1945 German urban planning only marked the latest installment in its dark and illiberal legacy. He charged that the "pure and benevolent humanity" supposedly characterizing "the great Western discourse" of pre-1914 European architecture had been mercilessly undermined by the "anti-intellectual terrorism of dictatorial groups such as the Bauhaus literati and later the masters of the Third Reich." Here he exercised little restraint in portraying the Bauhaus as an incorrigible band of "wild and agitated terrorists" inspired by the "non-Western thinking" of Gropius himself. For him, the Bauhaus was essentially a perverse red menace that propagated an architectural idiom "that was not German, but rather the jargon of the Communist International."[4] With this, Schwarz had clearly defied postwar convention by arguing that Germany's alleged deviation from the "Western tradition" of humanist culture did not first occur with the Nazi assumption of power in 1933, but rather in 1919 with the creation of the Bauhaus and its "dark, materialist *Weltan-*

schauung."[5] Scandalous as this was, he shocked his readers even more so by concluding that well-publicized Nazi closure of the Bauhaus in 1933 was both warranted and necessary.[6]

It was hardly surprising that the publication of the essay incited a torrent of indignation. Predictably, Schwarz was immediately branded a Nazi, as Gropius and his defenders denounced his *corpus delicti* as nothing but the unfortunate replay of former Nazi exhortations. The implication behind Schwarz's bitter attack that there was a certain continuity from Bauhaus Modernism to Nazi architecture and later to post-1945 city planning was forgotten amid the fury resulting from his slander against the Bauhaus and especially its founder.[7] Indeed, a whole range of Bauhaus sympathizers in West Germany, including not only former Bauhaus members but a larger lay public as well, rose to defend Gropius and the Bauhaus from what was deemed the "spirit of 1934,"[8] filling the next two journal issues with passionate rejoinders. Even though Gropius himself seemed rather unmoved by the affair, concluding that the Bauhaus "was as far removed from Marxist philosophy as from the world of Nazi ideology,"[9] the West German editorials were much more vitriolic. Statements such as "This man should know what is and is not permissible. . . . Shock and horror against the Bauhaus. . . . This is all the more grave since there are young people who might believe what he says about the Bauhaus and Jugendstil . . ." were standard fare.[10] Consistently equating Schwarz with either Joseph Goebbels or Schultze-Naumburg, the contributors launched an extensive damage-control campaign by reaffirming the Bauhaus as the vessel of a benevolent international modernism and returning Gropius to the noble pedigree of William Morris and Goethe.

Much of the intensity of the reaction could be attributed to the fact that Schwarz's diatribe was not only an attack against the Bauhaus, but also against the ongoing reorganization of cultural memory during the Adenauer Restoration. Here it pays to recall that in order to rehabilitate a non-Nazi German past to which a cautious postwar generation could claim allegiance, there was a concerted effort during the late 1940s and early 1950s to recover an exiled, threatened, and/or destroyed "better Germany." Josef Witsch and Max Bense's *Almanach der Unvergessenen* (1946), Walter Berendsohn's *Die Humanistische Front* (1946), and Richard Drews and Alfred Kantorowicz's *Verboten und Verbrannt* (1947) were only a few titles in a much broader cottage industry of texts devoted to recuperating a select group of cultural figures with which the Federal Republic hoped to establish an elective affinity. This of course was no easy task, however.

The project to construct a palatable West German identity was continually bedevilled by the fact that most German cultural spheres, be it architecture, painting, film, music, philosophy, literature, or history writing, had been badly contaminated by Nazi association. Even worse, what little antifascist culture did exist was confounded by its explicit linkage to communism.[11] Much of the attention consequently focused on recounting the glories of exiled Weimar heroes such as Gropius, Thomas Mann, and even a reimported Frankfurt School, who were all construed as living testimony of a positive, non-Nazi German culture.[12] In this setting, the Bauhaus provided timely political service in that it was one of the few German traditions that apparently satisfied the Cold War criteria of antifascism, anticommunism, and international modernism.

All the same, the Schwarz Controversy generated little interest among West German architects. Besides *Baukunst und Werkform,* West Germany's other specialized architectural journals published virtually nothing about the event, nor were any follow-up conferences arranged to discuss its possible import. In fact, West German architects and urban planners (despite Schwarz's worries) paid little attention to the Bauhaus and the Bauhaüsler during the 1950s.[13] Comprising a mixture of traditionalists and middle-of-the-road modernists, most of whom had served under the Nazis, the West German architecture profession still retained a 1930s image of a radical leftist Bauhaus, one that blocked off its potential relevance for postwar planning.[14] Yet this absence of interest among postwar architects did not mean that the Bauhaus remained unimportant to West Germans; the point was rather that its reception took place far outside architecture circles where the Bauhaus and its founder lived on as affirmative icons of an uncorrupted Weimar culture. That the Schwarz Controversy enjoyed its most significant coverage not in specialized architecture journals but in more mainstream West German cultural publications only confirms the extent to which Gropius and the Bauhaus were identified by the lay public as precious cultural capital in need of safeguarding.[15]

It is well to remember that the postwar rehabilitation of the Bauhaus was already well under way by the time of the Schwarz Controversy. Essential here was that the educated West German public did not view the Bauhaus as a renegade band of radical architects. Thanks in large part to the post-1945 retroactive redemption of those condemned by the Nazis at the famous 1937 *Degenerate Art* exhibition, the popular Cold War image of the Bauhaus shifted from a hotbed of leftist architecture to a bold yet innocent school of fine arts.[16] This was especially evident in the first postwar

Bauhaus show, the 1950 *Painters at the Bauhaus* exhibition in Munich.[17] The once central Bauhaus idea of moving beyond the cult of the autonomous artist and its attendant trappings of excessive subjectivity—perhaps best expressed in Gropius' famous 1923 "Art and Technology: A New Unity" speech—was forgotten amid the postwar rediscovery of the Bauhaus as a key moment in a lost German tradition of liberal humanism.[18] Indeed, the Bauhaus master painters, especially Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky, were now celebrated by West Germans as part of this broader Cold War campaign to affix abstract expressionism (due to its apparent glorification of artistic freedom and individuality) as the preferred iconography of the West.[19] The dissemination of Bauhaus Modernism throughout West German middle-class cultural life (as witnessed in domestic interiors, furniture styling, wallpaper, poster art, and graphic design)[20] further deradicalized the Bauhaus in the eyes of the public, while making its cultural wares available for mass consumption for the first time. Likewise, Bauhaus teaching pedagogy was hailed by West German educators as an exemplary humanist model for training artists, artisans, and designers.[21] So even if only as a dead letter to postwar architects, the Bauhaus enjoyed a marked renaissance within mainstream West German culture.

The popularization of Bauhaus Modernism was particularly evident in the sphere of industrial design. In part this was because this Bauhaus legacy was by no means a fixed and shared heritage, but itself became a bone of contention between West Germany's competing design cultures. On the one hand, the organic design culture (generally known by its more derogatory epiphet, *Nierentischkultur*) identified the abstract organic motifs found in the work of Klee and Kandinsky as its guiding design principles. The brash colors and wild asymmetrical shapes of 1950s lamps, vases, ashtrays, and tapestries were part of this organic design culture's concerted attempt to depict the lively spirit and painterly innovations as the Bauhaus' true heritage.[22] On the other hand, the more institutionalized design culture of the refounded German *Werkbund,* the Ulm Institute of Design, the design firms of Braun and WMF, as well as the German Design Council all sought to foreground the more austere functionalist dimension of Bauhaus modernism.[23] Rejecting this organic design's "applied Kandinsky" as whimsical and irresponsible, these postwar functionalists embraced this *Neue Sachlichkeit* design as more appropriate in assuring the quality production of badly needed everyday household objects after the war. While it is unnecessary at this point to go into detail about the specific

battles over this Weimar legacy, the conflict did underline the Bauhaus' cultural authority as a polestar of postfascist cultural liberalism.[24]

In this context, Schwarz's polemic against the Bauhaus potentially obstructed this postwar reconstruction of cultural memory. For however much the Bauhaus apologists worked to parry Schwarz's attack with counteraccusations, the charge that the Bauhaus was really communist could not be so easily dismissed. Not only was Bauhaus history peppered throughout with leftist teachers and students, there was no way of denying that Gropius' handpicked successor, Hannes Meyer, who supervised Bauhaus activities from 1927 to 1930, was an avowed communist. During his tenure, Meyer devoted his energies to changing the Bauhaus' image and upper-crust clientele by instituting a more leftist program based on "the needs of the people instead of luxury needs" (*Volksbedarf statt Luxusbedarf*) as well as bringing the school's workshop in closer contact with trade unions and the workers' movement. Moreover, he radically transformed Bauhaus pedagogy by cleansing it of any lingering artisan ethos and/or expressionist mysticism in favor of a more "secular" design philosophy grounded in the scientific principles of rationalized industrial production.[25] But given both the Cold War cultural climate and the political value of the Bauhaus legacy, it was clear that this segment of Bauhaus history needed to be rewritten. Meyer thus became the convenient scapegoat of all Bauhaus problems in the Cold War revisionist historiography. At the above-mentioned 1950 *Painters at the Bauhaus* exhibition, for instance, Meyer was derided as nothing but a "disciple of doctrinaire materialism" who interpreted "the concept of function too literally and mechanically by suppressing its artistic dimension," thereby perverting the gospel of Gropius and sabotaging the Bauhaus mission.[26] The eruption of the Schwarz Controversy three years later furnished another chance to deflect harmful Bauhaus criticism away from Gropius and the rest of the Bauhaus and instead onto Meyer's biography. This was perfectly illustrated in Gropius' editorial reply to Schwarz when he insisted that any political orientation or leftist image of the Bauhaus could only be attributed to Meyer's unsavory efforts.[27] Demonizing Meyer as the real target of Schwarz's charges worked to defuse the potentially damaging attack, closing off any chance of exploring the Bauhaus' rich and contradictory record. After this, all questions about the radical political elements of Bauhaus history—including the peculiar place of Bauhaus Modernism within the Third Reich[28]—were effectively suppressed during the 1950s and 1960s.

With the Schwarz Controversy already long forgotten, the 1955 christen-

ing of the Ulm Institute of Design (*Hochschule für Gestaltung*) as the "New Bauhaus" served as a good example of the perceived Cold War connections among antifascism, the Bauhaus heritage, and cultural regeneration. Initially inspired by Inge Scholl, who wanted to create a new school of democratic education in honor of her two siblings who were killed as members of the White Rose resistance group, the establishment of the Ulm design school represented a decisive moment in American–West German cultural relations after the war.[29] That the American High Command of Germany and the West German government jointly underwrote the Ulm project dramatized the extent to which rebaptizing the Bauhaus served as indispensable Cold War diplomacy.[30] In fact, the inauguration ceremony, punctuated by Gropius' keynote address, functioned as a spectacle of a reformed West Germany, as such notables as Henry van de Velde, Albert Einstein, Carl Zuckmayer, Theodor Heuss, and even Ludwig Erhard all lent their public support. Journalists too roundly applauded what one observer called "the Bauhaus idea come home" as a boon for an enlightened West German culture.[31] Given West Germany's campaign to distance itself from its fascist past and to establish closer cultural relations with the United States, the Ulm Institute's privileged pedigree of both anti-Nazi resistance and Bauhaus Modernism provided timely testimony to this cause.[32]

Like the West Germans, the Americans also believed that the return of the Bauhaus to West Germany represented a positive step in its cultural re-education. While it is true that American enthusiasm toward the Ulm Institute was generally confined to architecture and design circles, the school occasionally was pressed into Cold War service in the United States as well. The 1957 special issue of *Atlantic Monthly* entitled "The New Germany" was a good case in point. It demonstrated the power of the Bauhaus image in assuring a still uneasy American audience that despite its recent history, the Federal Republic of Germany was "in all phases of its life oriented toward the West and can be described in terms comprehensible to the Free World."[33] In this magazine's effort to lionize a select group of leading West German conservative modernists, including Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Ernst Jünger, Gottfried Benn, and Hans Holthusen, who were considered capable of guiding West Germany back into the charmed circle of the West, the Ulm school carried a special mission. Indeed, its unique heritage of antifascism and international modernism was greeted as a vital means by which West Germans could "lead their country back into the main line of European cultural develop-

ment."[34] The establishment of the Ulm Institute as a West German inspired, American financed joint venture was thus singled out for its decisive political role in helping forge a new cultural partnership between the United States and West Germany after 1945. It was for this reason that one West German cultural historian ironically described the school's importance as a sort of "coming to terms with past (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) with American assistance."[35]

At the same time, the Bauhaus story also helped Cold War America articulate a new cultural identity. On one level, the celebration of the Bauhaus emigration to the United States was initially part of a larger literature praising the cultural contributions of the Weimar diaspora in America.[36] Peter Blake's *Marcel Breuer* (1949), Philip Johnson's *Mies van der Rohe* (1953) and James Marston Fitch's *Walter Gropius* (1960) were only a few texts among many that chronicled the successful migration of the so-called "Bauhaus idea" to Harvard University's Graduate School of Design, the Illinois Institute of Technology, and North Carolina's Black Mountain College. At stake, however, was more than simply popularizing these transplanted European architects for an American audience.[37] Leaving aside the complexities of this reception story, it suffices to say that American architects and cultural critics during the 1950s increasingly viewed Bauhaus Modernism as a new and viable alternative to what they felt to be the suffocating romantic provincialism of American architecture, be it the Bay Regional Style or even Frank Lloyd Wright's anti-urban projects. A Bauhaus-inspired International Style was for them a more suitable cultural expression of America's new Cold War political identity.[38]

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the American writers rewrote the Bauhaus story in accordance with this new attitude. What is interesting is that they largely relied upon three pre-Cold War texts as touchstones for their revision: Henry Hitchcock and Philip Johnson's catalogue to the 1932 Museum of Modern Art exhibition, *The International Style;* Nikolaus Pevsner's *Pioneers of the Modern Movement* (1936); and Sigfried Giedion's *Space, Time, and Architecture* (1941).[39] Even though they were originally written to promote international modernism as the legitimate successor to a classical architectural tradition, these texts were used to transmute seemingly apolitical architecture history into Cold War cultural capital. Much of this had to do with the fact that insofar as these pre-1945 histories posited Gropius and the Bauhaus as the narrative resolution of architectural history, the Bauhaus' migration to America in turn implied that the United States had now become the very seat of international modernism.

The special 1950 Bauhaus issue of *L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui*—which was edited by Gropius' student Paul Rudolph—made this clear by boldly claiming that the Bauhaus exodus to America symbolized the seismic shift of cultural preeminence from Europe to the United States.[40] Other American chroniclers extended this logic during the 1950s by downplaying the German phase of the Bauhaus story, emphasizing instead the migration as the decisive event in the narrative. Since these writers construed the success of the Bauhaus program as primarily a function of its immigration to America, praising the Bauhaus was inseparable from lauding the virtues of an America that made this transplant possible in the first place. The Bauhaus passage to the United States thus not only promoted the cherished self-image of America as the land of freedom and opportunity, but also as the rightful heir and guardian of International Modernism.

No less significant was that these chroniclers saw no contradiction in reinscribing Bauhaus-style international modernism as fundamentally American. Indeed, they felt that the marriage of European culture and American civil society informed the very substance of an American Cold War cultural identity.[41] The American embassy architecture of the 1950s and early 1960s (including Gropius' American Embassy in Athens),[42] the marketing of Bauhaus graphic design,[43] and even the New York Museum of Modern Art's concerted interventions to popularize the Bauhaus in American architecture and design circles were all part of this wider Cold War campaign to appropriate this Bauhaus-inspired International Style to these political ends.[44] So whereas the West Germans worked to salvage the Bauhaus legacy as a needed symbol of a (West) German modernist past, the American celebration of the Bauhaus paid tribute to a new and powerful American modernist present.[45]

This is by no means to suggest, however, that Gropius was unfairly exploited by American cold warriors. In fact, he very much contributed to this American revision of the Bauhaus story. Gropius' co-organization (together with Ise Gropius and Herbert Bayer) of the Bauhaus' first exhibition in the United States, the *Bauhaus 1919-1928* show at New York's Museum of Modern Art in 1938, indicated how Bauhaus history had been refashioned to suit an American audience from the very beginning. Precious little information, for instance, was given about the Bauhaus' colorful political background or internal difficulties; furthermore, the Bauhaus' early expressionistic phase, Gropius' more political pieces (see, for example, his 1919 *Ja! Stimmen des Arbeitsrates für Kunst* essay or his contribution to the 1919 *Deutscher Revolutions Almanach*) together with the entire

Meyer period were coolly omitted. Since the exhibition was confined exclusively to the Gropius tenure, the whole complex Bauhaus narrative was carefully reworked as a spectacle of cultural liberalism with which all could sympathize and identify.[46]

Following the conclusion of World War II, Gropius again played an active role in repackaging the Bauhaus story for American consumption. Evidence of this could be seen when the United States government enlisted Gropius for Cold War action, sponsoring his return to bombed-out Berlin in 1947 and 1948 for two lectures on the future of German reconstruction. That he arrived as the "official architectural adviser" of General Lucius Clay underscored how the onetime Weimar modernist had now been reflagged as a new spokesperson for American-style modernization.[47] His status as living testimony of both a good German past and a powerful American present granted him special cultural authority as frequent allied consultant for postwar reconstruction plans, while many of his essays were reprinted in the CIA-financed West German publications (for example, *Der Monat*) as postwar guidance.[48] At that time, Gropius also canvassed for a Bauhaus exhibition in occupied Germany as an effective means of promoting German cultural re-education.[49] Once back in the United States, Gropius continued his publicity campaign to bleach the Bauhaus story of any damaging leftist association and to replace his one-time 1920s image as founder of the "Cathedral of Socialism" with his new role as "Apollo in the Democracy."[50] All of the central ideas propagated by Gropius in the 1938 exhibition—that Gropius and the Bauhaus were practically synonymous, that the Bauhaus transcended petty politics (save Meyer as the eternal villain) and that the Bauhaus had always been a beacon of freedom and cultural liberalism—were simply incorporated into the Cold War Americanization of the Bauhaus saga. In fact, it is difficult to find any American text on the Bauhaus written after 1945 (outside the monographs on Mies) that do not include Gropius' editorial signature and/or personal collaboration.[51] The American chroniclers therefore ended up extending Gropius' American revision of Bauhaus history as an epic drama of monumental heroes and endangered modernists.[52]

During this period, Gropius was also honored with numerous cultural prizes in West Germany. His reception of both the 1956 Hamburg Hanseatic and the 1961 Frankfurt Goethe prizes further sanctified his West German image, highlighting the degree to which Gropius had eclipsed even the Bauhaus painters in the Cold War revision. The prize ceremonies anointing Gropius as the new Goethe received wide press throughout the

Federal Republic, where publications as diverse as *Frankfurter Hefte* and *Handelsblatt, Vorwärts,* and *Bild* covered the spectacle awash in hyberbolic language.[53] Over and over again Gropius was lifted from history and dissolved into the overarching image of Goethe wherein the architect's work was reconfigured as what one journalist euphorically called "Goethe's ideas cut in stone."[54] Linking Gropius' already sanitized biography with Goethe's meant that key historical events such as the 1920s controversial struggle to introduce flat roofs in German housing construction (which was seen at the time as a "communist" or "foreign" assault upon traditionally sloped German roofs)[55] could be rewritten as Gropius' prophetic mission to popularize a Goethe-inspired democratic architectural idiom.[56]

A Weimar exile ensconced in America since 1937, Gropius was thereupon elevated alongside Goethe into West Germany's new cultural pantheon.[57] For some observers, Gropius had even dislodged Thomas Mann as the new *Praeceptor Germaniae.*[58]

Even so, Gropius himself occasionally defied his status as Cold War symbol. Nowhere was this more evident than in his acceptance speech for the 1956 Hamburg Hanseatic Goethe prize entitled "Apollo in the Democracy." Here Gropius did not sing the praises of American modernization nor even liberal Weimar culture. Instead he advocated a rediscovered nineteenth-century German romanticism.[59] Having eschewed the world of industrialization and urban planning, Gropius now argued that all artists must concern themselves with "the creation of beauty and with the measure of its reverberations in a democratic society" since "the creation and love of beauty not only enrich humanity with a great measure of happiness but also bring forth ethical powers."[60] The newly anointed hero of American liberalism had this time returned to revive an older German *Kultur.*

So understood, this image of Gropius as a nineteenth-century romantic should have complicated the postwar revision of the Bauhaus legacy as a dual referent for Weimar liberalism and American modernity. No matter how much we would like to believe that Gropius' speech was essentially an attempt to reconcile functionalism, architectural regionalism, and German romanticism in a vague liberation theology of transatlantic modernism, the point remains that his renewed romanticism skewed the ideological invention of his post-1945 (self-)image. This confounded Gropius' postwar status more than ever. Whereas he first arrived in postwar Germany as a U.S. government–sponsored architect entrusted to help "Ameri-

canize" the Germans, he returned a few years later to help "re-Germanize" (the artist as social engineer serving as the key trope of German *Kultur*) the newly Americanized West Germans. Thus Gropius' return had unwittingly called into question much of this Cold War invention of the Bauhaus legacy. Not only did his championship of German romanticism and the cultural authority of the artist expose the artificiality of explaining the Bauhaus' success as largely a function of American modernity, it also challenged the Cold War construction of the Bauhaus as an easy synthesis of international modernism and American modernization.[61]

But however thorny this "other" Gropius might have been to the ongoing appropriation of the Bauhaus story as West German cultural diplomacy, this new romanticist image was simply added to the already rich legend of the Bauhaus founder. That these contradictions embodied in Gropius' character and the larger Bauhaus story remained unaddressed apparently disturbed no one, least of all Gropius himself. One possible reason for this lack of sociological scrutiny at the time may have been that the contradictions in the Bauhaus story were the very same ones that haunted the larger construction of West German culture in general. That is, the narrative difficulties associated with representing Gropius and the Bauhaus as simultaneous symbols of both the 1920s and the 1950s, German *Kultur* and American Civilization, European romanticism and international liberalism neatly captured the disparate elements that informed a highly ambiguous West German identity. This may explain why these contradictions were never identified as such, since West German culture was as equally indeterminate and polyvalent as the Bauhaus saga itself. Hence it was no accident that these overdetermined Bauhaus stories and monumentalized biographies, given their importance in serving a wide range of Cold War cultural needs, were simply reproduced.[62] The conspicuous lack of historical analysis during the 1950s and 1960s was less a function of second-rate formalist architectural commentary than an integral component of this Cold War logic to recast the Bauhaus as a key touchstone of a newly formed atlantic modernism.

For these reasons, the Bauhaus enjoyed continued cultural prestige in West Germany throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Of course this is by no means to suggest that Bauhaus Modernism completely dominated West German culture. Besides the fact that postwar architecture remained a hodgepodge of traditionalist and modernist styles,[63] the sphere of industrial design also witnessed a sort of popular backlash against the severity of Bauhaus forms in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the introduction of more

organic, decorative, and Italian designs. What was important, however, was that Bauhaus Modernism was nonetheless elevated as West Germany's official architectural and design aesthetic. Not only was this evident in its representational architecture—consider for example the 1951 Bonn Bundeshaus, the 1957 Berlin *INTERBAU* exhibition, and the West German embassy building in Washington D.C.—it was also registered in the predominance of functionalist design in the West German contributions to the highly publicized Milan Design Triennale after the war.[64] But perhaps the most telling illustration of this was the West German Pavilion at the Brussels World Exposition in 1958. This event was all the more dramatic if we recall that the last world exhibition before this one had been the 1937 show in Paris, where Albert Speer's Nazi Pavilion broadcast an aggressive self-image of fascist Germany. In order to make plain that 1958 was not 1937, the West German government together with the German Design Council consciously showcased Bauhaus-inspired modernist architecture and design as testimony of West German cultural regeneration and political change.[65] In the end, the West German appropriation of this modernist style neatly expressed the imagined Cold War linkage between the Bauhaus and Bonn, the 1920s and 1950s, national and international modernism.

What is more, this West German conception of the Bauhaus was ultimately reinforced by East Germany as well, albeit from a different political perspective. Here it is worth remembering that by the early 1950s Bauhaus Modernism had become a highly politicized symbol in the Cold War cultural rivalry between East and West Germany. In reaction to its ongoing popularization in the West, East German Premier Walter Ulbricht responded by officially condemning first the "Bauhaus style" as debased "bourgeois formalism" and then functionalism in general as sinister ideological propaganda from the United States.[66] Ironically, Schwarz's claim that the Bauhaus was really communist found no resonance in East Germany in the first two decades after the war. Even Hannes Meyer was denounced as a "reactionary constructivist."[67] As a result, Ulbricht's antipathy toward the Bauhaus in favor of a more traditional and even nationalist architectural idiom helped secure the Bauhaus' postwar place as a symbol of Western liberal culture.[68] The occidental conversion of the Bauhaus into ready Cold War cultural capital then went far beyond architectural style wars. Just as the (American-style) narrative of Western liberalism was used during the Cold War as a barometer by which to measure the political maturity of nations, this International Style was often applied as a yard-

stick of (Western) cultural progress.[69] From this perspective, Bauhaus Modernism not only served as testimony to American and West German modernity, but also as the visual expression of Cold War modernization theory.[70]

A few years later, the 1968 Stuttgart *Fifty Years Bauhaus* exhibition functioned as the crowning event in the West German cultural canonization of the Bauhaus and Gropius. Attended by over 75,000 visitors, this show represented the grand spectacle of Bauhaus history by reproducing all of the Cold War orthodoxies: The Bauhaus was hailed as Weimar Germany's greatest achievement in cultural liberalism;[71] Gropius once again emerged as the singular hero of the Bauhaus, whereas Mies, Breuer, and the others were recast as simply subordinate figures;[72] while Meyer was accorded merely two sentences in the exhibition catalogue as provisional director during the school's interregnum. This 1968 show thereby acted as the logical culmination of this Cold War reworking of the Bauhaus story as a redemptive icon of 1920s culture, one that helped temper the infamous "special path" (*Sonderweg*) of German history by recalling its Weimar legacy of international modernism. And even if the Bauhaus revision may have indirectly confirmed the Cold War understanding of German history as a tragic tale of cultural modernity and political immaturity, it did provide evidence—as many West Germans and Americans were quick to indicate—of both a liberal modernist heritage and a bridge to America. The former curator of the Bauhaus Archive could then remark with great justification: "The Bauhaus counts as Germany's most substantial gift of modern culture to America . . . it now belongs to the entire world—but what concerns us especially is this: it is for Americans and Germans the shining symbol of our great spiritual solidarity."[73]

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With this, the possibility of opening up a more general historical discussion of the Bauhaus was cordoned off after 1945. Schwarz's effort to challenge the cultural authority of Gropius and the Bauhaus was the first and last public criticism levelled against the Bauhaus in West Germany until the mid-1960s. More than that, the controversy revealed the crucial point that criticizing the Bauhaus had itself become a postwar taboo, a sign of dangerous illiberalism.[74] Certain questions consequently remained untouched in the Cold War revision: Is it not ahistorical and misleading to characterize all Bauhaus opponents as (proto-) Nazis? Why were Weimar

liberals and conservatives (long before the advent of the Nazis) often the most vociferous Bauhaus critics? Whatever happened to those Bauhaus members who did not emigrate after 1933? Or, is it not important to recall that Gropius and Mies both submitted architectural proposals to various Nazi exhibitions complete with swastikas in their drawings?[75] It should be clear that this is not an attempt to slander these figures but rather to call attention to the historiographical exclusion of these complicated issues. For what the postwar suppression of these questions ironically reveals is that the long forgotten Schwarz Controversy always rested at the symbolic center of the West German revision, furnishing all of the narrative material necessary for protecting the Bauhaus legend as a precious symbol of benevolent international modernism. In a strange twist of fate, Schwarz unwittingly served as the forgotten mediator of the Cold War canonization of Gropius and the Bauhaus.

In recent years, however, this postwar project to affix Bauhaus Modernism as a totem of International Style liberalism has all but disappeared. The post-1968 re-encoding of Bauhaus Modernism as oppressive and inhumane; the revenge of decoration, ornamentation, and historicism as the hallmarks of postmodern architecture; and even the recent criticism of Gropius and Mies van der Rohe as less than angelic figures in their personal politics have cast a noticeable pall over the once sunny Bauhaus imperium.[76] But there was more at stake than simply defrocking the 1920s prophets of therapeutic modernism. This post-1968 Bauhaus critique had questioned the central article of faith propelling the Bauhaus revision through the 1950s and 1960s, namely the elision of Bauhaus Modernism with international liberalism. It was thus small wonder that the postmodern critique, rejecting both the false dreams and practices of institutionalized modernism, identified the Bauhaus as its primary target.

Less well known, however, is how this Bauhaus critique also registered a decisive shift in U.S.–West German cultural relations. Tom Wolfe's 1981 *From Bauhaus to Our House* represented a telling example in this regard. His rereading of the triumph of Bauhaus modernism in the United States as less a sign of American cultural achievement than an unwanted architectural scourge from Germany indicated the extent to which the former Cold War belief in the Bauhaus as a favorite symbol of this transatlantic cultural partnership had collapsed by the early 1980s. The significance of Wolfe's well-publicized polemic resided not in the critique itself (which had been articulated many times since the late 1960s) but in the fact that he popularized this Bauhaus critique for a mainstream lay audience. This

was certainly no small event, especially if we recall that Gropius and the Bauhaus had long ago been lifted from architectural history proper and recast as popular cultural icons of a shared liberal modernist heritage. So more than just another attack against the long embattled Bauhaus legacy, Wolfe's nationalist booklet mirrored the newly felt separation of American and West German cultural history.[77]

These estranged cultural relations were illustrated even more dramatically by West Germany's ongoing "rediscovery" of its German identity during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The period witnessed a steady stream of revisionist histories that shattered what were then the Cold War orthodoxies of West German politics and culture, much of which included a radical reconstruction of the Nazi and Holocaust legacies.[78] Closely connected to this so-called "normalization" of German History was the peculiar nationalization of 1950s cultural life in these *Tendenzwende* revisions. While this at first may seem quite axiomatic, it pays to remember that the founding myth of West German culture was that it had been effectively cleansed of any nationalist pathos or proclivities. This represented a marked change in West German cultural consciousness insofar as the early Cold War campaign to frame a new postwar culture as a category of international modernism had begun to wear thin by the late 1970s. The widespread historiographical interest in "German national identity";[79] the reworking of national(ist) narratives in painting, film, and the so-called "historians' debate";[80] the more general nostalgia for the "Golden 50s" and its affluent popular culture;[81] the new fascination with the unofficial "everyday history" (*Alltagsgeschichte*) of postwar life as well as the explosion in regional and local *Heimat* museums all registered this new attitude toward the past.[82] It was then no coincidence that this re-evaluation of West German identity was also aimed at the Bauhaus. As a complement to Wolfe, various West German cultural historians set out to debunk the 1950s popularity of Bauhaus modernism as exaggerated and elitist. It was now construed as essentially a representational style of the state and of educated upper middle classes that had little to do with popular culture.[83] However overstated this was, it did reveal an undeniable shift in this reception history. The Bauhaus story, once serving as a narrative bridge linking West Germany and the United States, now pointed up their differences.

In light of the Cold War reworking of Bauhaus history, it was only inevitable that the end of the Cold War would prompt further revision. The historiographical changes can best be seen in the fact that the cultural construction of the Bauhaus legend has now become the new focal point

of scholarly attention. Texts such as Magdalena Droste's 1990 *Bauhaus 1919-1933*, which places the Gropius, Meyer, and Mies tenures in a balanced interpretative context; K. Michael Hays' rehabilitation of Hannes Meyer as a forgotten Bauhaus radical modernist in his *Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject: The Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer* (1992); Winfried Nerdinger's edited *Bauhaus-Moderne im Nationalsozialismus* (1993), a collection of essays exploring the strange afterlife of Bauhaus Modernism within the Third Reich; and the documentary history of the Schwarz Controversy, *Die Bauhaus-Debatte 1953* (1994) all represent new and important post–Cold War forays into what just ten years ago were still taboo zones of Bauhaus historiography. What this means of course is that the significance (and the future) of Bauhaus history is now more indeterminate than ever; how and to what end the Bauhaus saga will be reorganized after reunification remains very much an open question. But whatever its future, it is clear that the Cold War revision of Bauhaus history has finally become the past, a historiographical museum piece of High Modernism. More than just another installment in the historical intersection of (modernist) aesthetics and politics, the rise and fall of the Bauhaus legend still afford a rich case study of the ways in which hothouse cultural identities were imagined and negotiated under the political imperatives of the Cold War.

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1. Among the most important texts addressing the postwar reception story are *Die Bauhaus-Debatte 1953: Dokumente einer verdrängten Kontroverse*, ed. Ulrich Conrads et al. (Braunschweig: Fr. Vieweg, 1994); Winfried Nerdinger, "'Anstößiges Rot': Hannes Meyer und der linke Baufunktionalismus—ein verdrängtes Kapitel der Architekturgeschichte," in *Hannes Meyer, 1886–1954: Architekt, Urbanist, Lehrer* (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1989), pp. 12–29; *100 Jahre Walter Gropius and Schliessung des Bauhauses 1933*, ed. Peter Hahn (Berlin: Bauhaus-Archiv, 1983); Christian Gröhn, *Die Bauhaus-Idee: Entwurf, Weiterführung, Rezeption* (Berlin: Gebrüder Mann, 1991); and William Jordy, "The Aftermath of the Bauhaus in America: Gropius, Mies, and Breuer," in *The Intellectual Migration*, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 485–543.

2. No doubt the events of 1989 have inspired a renewed scholarly interest in tracing the complex historical formation of West German modernity in the shadow of Nazism and the war. Recent titles include Heide Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity After Hitler* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Michael Wildt, *Am Beginn der "Konsumgesellschaft"* (Hamburg:

Ergebnisse, 1994); Robert Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley: University of California, 1993); Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn: JHW Dietz, 1993); *America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945–1955,* ed. Michael Ermarth (Providence: Berg, 1993); and *The Divided Heritage: Themes and Problems in German Modernism,* ed. Irit Rogoff (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

3. Rudolf Schwarz, "Das Anliegen der Baukunst," in *Mensch und Raum: Das Darmstädter Gespräch 1951,* ed. Otto Bartning (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1991), pp. 73–87. To be sure, Schwarz's antimodernist stance was by no means a product of the postwar period. More than twenty years before he had ridiculed modernist architecture as "artificial technologism" and "stupid function-loving materialism"; he even proclaimed in 1932 that the "Bauhaus style" had reached its inevitable "dead end." Rudolf Schwarz, "Neues Bauen" (1929) and "Baustelle Deutschland" (1932), both reprinted in *Rudolf Schwarz: Wegweiser der Technik und andere Schriften zum Neuen Bauen, 1926–1991,* ed. Maria Schwarz and Ulrich Conrads (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1979), pp. 121–131 and 141 respectively. A useful overview of Schwarz's architectural philosophy can be found in Winfried Nerdinger, "Das Bauhaus zwischen Mythisierung und Kritik," in Conrads et al., pp. 7–19.

4. Rudolf Schwarz, "Bilde Künstler, rede nicht," *Baukunst und Werkform,* vol. 6, no. 1 (January, 1953), pp. 9–17, quotations from pp. 15, 17.

5. Schwarz, "Bilde Künstler," pp. 15, 16.

6. Schwarz's exact words on this delicate point were as follows: "Darf man aber dem unbekannten SA-Mann und seinem großen Feldwebel übelnehmen, daß sie nicht glauben wollten, was gestern alles so laut trompetet wurde, sei jetzt nicht mehr wahr? Mußte nicht der Verdacht der Tarnung aufkommen? 'Das Bauhaus ist am Ungeist gestorben.' Oh ja, aber am eigenen, für den es schon sehr bald ein Symptom gibt, das niemals täuscht: den Verfall der Sprache. Was diese Literaten schrieben, war kein deutsch, sondern der Jargon der Komintern." Schwarz, "Bilde Künstler," p. 17.

7. Werner Durth, *Deutsche Architekten: Biographische Verflechtungen* (Munich: Taschenbuchverlag, 1992), pp. 434–448.

8. See for example Albert Schulze Vellinghausen, "Indirekte Festschrift für Gropius: Auf Verursachung von Professor Rudolf Schwarz," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 22 May 1953 and Louis Schoberth, "Schluß mit der Dolchstoßlegende," *Baukunst und Werkform* vol. 6, no. 2/3 (February/March, 1953), pp. 91–95.

9. Walter Gropius, "Polemik nach Rückwarts," *Die Neue Zeitung,* 11 April 1953.

10. These disparate quotations are taken from Christian Borngräber's *Stil Novo: Design in den Fünfziger Jahren* (Berlin: Dieter Fricke, 1978), p. 24.

11. Jost Hermand, *Kultur im Wiederaufbau* (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1989), pp. 89–108; Hermann Glaser, *Die Kulturgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* Bd. 1, 1945–1948 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1985), pp. 91–111.

12. Hermann Glaser, *Die Kulturgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* Bd. 2,

1949–1967 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1990).

13. Wiltrud and Joachim Petsch, *Die Bundesrepublik—eine neue Heimat?* (Berlin: Elefanten Press, 1983), pp. 67–83. Still, the later influence of Gropius and Mies van der Rohe on West German architects was not inconsequential. Günther Feuerstein, *New Directions in German Architecture* (New York: George Braziller, 1968), pp. 11–12.

14. Klaus von Beyme, *Der Wiederaufbau: Architektur und Städtebaupolitik in beiden deutschen Staaten* (Munich: R. Piper, 1987), pp. 60–70.

15. See for example the extensive coverage in *Die Neue Zeitung,* 4 and 11 March 1953.

16. Rainer Wick, *Bauhaus-Pädagogik* (Cologne: Dumont, 1982), pp. 299–309.

17. *Die Maler am Bauhaus,* ed. Ludwig Grote (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 1950).

18. The historical context of the Bauhaus' 1923 turn toward technology and industrial production is neatly recounted in Karl-Heinz Hüter, *Das Bauhaus in Weimar* (East Berlin, 1982). See also Adelheid von Saldern, "'Statt Kathedrale die Wohnmaschine': Parodoxien der Rationalisierung im Kontext der Moderne," *Zivilisation und Barbarei,* ed. Frank Bajohr et al. (Hamburg: Christians, 1991), pp. 168–191.

19. Martin Warnke, "Von der Gegenständlichkeit und der Ausbreitung der Abstrakten," in *Die 50er Jahre,* ed. Dieter Bänsch (Tübingen: Günther Narr, 1985), pp. 209–221 and Christine Hopfengart, *Klee: Von Sonderfall zum Publikumsliebling* (Mainz: Phillipp von Labern, 1989). For a good discussion of the politics behind the canonization of abstract expressionism in the United States, see Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1983) and *Pollock and After: The Critical Debate,* ed. Francis Frascina (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), esp. pp. 91–185.

20. Andreas Schwarz, "Design, Graphic Design, Werbung," in *Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* Bd. 4, *Kultur,* ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1989), pp. 290–369 and Michael Kriegskorte, *Werbung in Deutschland 1945–1965* (Cologne: Dumont, 1992).

21. Rudolf Kossolapow, *Design und Designer zwischen Tradition und Utopie* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1985), pp. 186–198.

22. For background of this 1950s organic design, Thomas Zaumschirm, *Die Fünfziger Jahre* (Munich: Wilhelm Heyne, 1980).

23. Gert Selle, *Design-Geschichte in Deutschland* (Cologne: Dumont, 1990), pp. 241–273.

24. The former director of England's Council of Industrial Design captured this sentiment by remarking that the Bauhaus "has become a symbol for all that is antitotalitarian in design, as much in contrast with the new Socialist Realism of the East as the ci-devant 'Blu-bo' (abbreviation for the Nazi "blood and soil" slogan, "Blut und Boden") of Nazism," in short, a "passport to respectability and a clean bill of political health." Paul Reilly, "German Enterprise in Wallpaper Design," *Design* 55 (July 1953), pp. 6–19. This was also registered in the exhibition catalogues "Designed in Germany Today, 1960–1961," sponsored by the West German Government, Ryerson Library, Chicago (no other publishing information) and *Made in Germany,* ed. Hans Wichmann

(Munich: Peter Winckler, 1966).

25. *Hannes Meyer: Bauten, Projekte und Schriften,* ed. Claude Schnaidt (Teufen: Arthur Niggli, 1965) and K. Michael Hays, *Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject: The Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer* (Cambridge: Massachsetts Institute of Technology, 1993), esp. pp. 121ff.

26. *Die Maler,* 10.

27. Walter Gropius, "Polemik nach Rückwärts," *Die Neue Zeitung,* 11–12 April 1953. Gropius again painted Meyer as the Bauhaus Judas in a November 1963 letter to Tomas Maldonado, docent at the Ulm Institute of Design, "Stellungsnahmen zu 'Ist das Bauhaus aktuell?'" *Ulm* 10/11 (May 1964), pp. 67–70.

28. This topic was first explored much later in *Bauhaus-Moderne im Nationalsozialismus: Zwischen Anbiederung und Verfolgung,* ed. Winfried Nerdinger (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 1993). For a pioneering work on the place of 1920s modernism within Nazi culture, *Dekoration der Gewalt,* ed. Berthold Hinz (Giessen: Anabas, 1979).

29. For a good discussion of the school's early history, see Eva von Seckendorff's *Die Hochschule für Gestaltung in Ulm* (Marburg: Jonas, 1989).

30. From the beginning, John J. McCloy, director of the American High Command, welcomed Scholl's design school as an important contribution to West Germany's cultural re-education. In a 1950 Boston speech, he maintained that Scholl's "crusade to enlighten the German people" was inseparable from the Allied effort to "help the German people take a democratic road" and "find a close association with the peoples of Western Europe." John McCloy, untitled Boston speech (IO/433), Stadtarchiv, Ulm. Background on McCloy's decisive role in helping shape a West German polity can be found in Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1991), esp. pp. 156–184. It is perhaps worth noting that McCloy's High Command was also responsible for re-establishing the famed Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt after the war. Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), p. 282.

31. Seckendorff, pp. 89ff. Note as well Walter Dirks, "Das Bauhaus und die Weiße Rose," *Frankfurter Hefte,* vol. 10, no. 11 (1955), pp. 769–773 and Manfred George, "Eine Helferin des 'anderen Deutschlands,'" *Aufbau,* 25 November 1956. This is not to say, however, that the Ulm school simply carried out Gropius' conception of the Bauhaus legacy. After the 1957 departure of Max Bill, the school became increasingly critical toward the Bauhaus heritage and especially its Gropius tenure, rediscovering instead the Meyer period in Dessau as more relevant to postwar conditions. Paul Betts, "The Pathos of Everyday Objects: West German Industrial Design Culture, 1945–1965," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1995, Chapter 3.

32. Evidence of this can be seen in Inge Scholl's 1955 inauguration speech, which is partly reprinted in *Die Moral der Gegenstände,* ed. Herbert Lindinger (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1987), p. 20.

33. Editor's Introduction, *Atlantic Monthly* (March 1957), p. 102.

34. Clemens Fiedler, "The New Bauhaus in Ulm," *Atlantic Monthly*, p. 144. If we recall that a slew of newly built modernist buildings filled the pages of the "Art as Expression of Freedom" section and that a Bauhaus style building was superimposed on the cover of this special "New Germany" issue, it was clear that Bauhaus Modernism functioned as visual shorthand for West German cultural progress. Another example of this is Lorenz Eitner, "Industrial Design in Postwar Germany," *Design Quarterly* 40 (March 1957), pp. 3–24.

35. Borngräber, p. 23.

36. *The Cultural Migration: The European Scholar in America*, ed. Franz Neumann and Carla Borden (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1953) and *The Muses Flee Hitler: Cultural Transfer and Adaptation, 1930–1945*, ed. Jerrell Jackman (Washington: Smithsonian, 1983).

37. Much of this popularization campaign often pivoted on deradicalizing the Bauhaus heritage for a postwar lay public. One American biographer went so far as to say that Gropius' vision of aesthetic education "sounds like an almost Tolstoyan doctrine of personal regeneration: it is not even a call to simple trade unionism, much less to radical political action . . . a blunter rejection of Marxism and kindred utopias is inconceivable." James Marston Fitch, *Walter Gropius* (New York: Geo. Braziller, 1960), p. 29. These ideas were elaborated in his *Architecture and the Aesthetics of Plenty* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 133–170. For a similar exercise, see Sigfried Giedion's *Walter Gropius: Work and Teamwork* (New York: Reinhold, 1954).

38. This is not to say, however, that everyone was enthusiastic about the new popularity of the Bauhaus in America. For the defense of "American Regionalism," see Vincent Scully's "Wright vs. the International Style," *Art News* 53 (March 1954), pp. 32–35.

39. Other key texts mediating the American reception of European architectural modernism were Henry Russell Hitchcock's *Modern Architecture: Romanticism and Reintegration* (1929); Walter Curt Behrendt, *Modern Building* (1937) and J.M. Richards, *An Introduction to Modern Architecture* (1940). Margret Kentgens-Craig, *Bauhaus-Architektur: Die Rezeption in Amerika, 1919–1936* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993), esp. pp. 44–80 and 173–185.

40. A colorful polemic about Gropius' role as savior of American architecture can be read in Giedion's entry, "Walter Gropius," *L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui* (February 1950). Giedion's key historical role in mediating the reception of modernism is addressed by Winfried Nerdinger, "Historiograph der modernen Architektur," *Neue Zürich Zeitung*, 8 April 1988.

41. Fleming and Bailyn, especially the introduction.

42. Ron Robin, *Enclaves of America: The Rhetoric of American Political Architecture Abroad, 1900–1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 136–166.

43. The value of Bauhaus modernism for American business was neatly illustrated in a 1959 pamphlet, "Industrial Design in the United States," published by the European Productivity Agency of the Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation. Written as a follow-up report after a team of European industrialists and educators were

invited by the United States to observe American industrial design culture in action, the eighty-page report consistently underlined the Bauhaus' importance for an expanding postwar American business culture. Foregrounding the success of Bauhaus as a function of its American transplant, the unnamed author of the report boasts that these "Bauhaus ideas soon achieved importance in the United States where the idealistic views of the Bauhaus were combined with the American business mentality to form a modern Industrial Design Philosophy, *a typical American product,* where idealism and business thrive side by side" (emphasis added). For a good discussion of the relations between the Chicago Bauhaus and American business, James Sloan Allen's *The Romance of Commerce and Culture: Capitalism, Modernism and the Chicago-Aspen Crusade for Cultural Reform* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1983).

44. Terry Smith, *Making the Modern: Industry, Art and Design in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993), pp. 385–404.

45. William Jordy, *American Building and their Architects: The Impact of European Modernism in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (Garden City, N.J.: Anchor, 1976).

46. The exhibition's dramatic simplification of Bauhaus history was illustrated in a section called "The Confusion of the Postwar Period" in which Alexander Dorner described the Weimar situation as follows: "German opinion was divided into extreme factions. On one side were aligned all those who could not understand that the pre-war period was dead; on the other stood men and women determined to learn from the debacle, and to find a new way of life. The latter, even outside Germany, were drawn to the Bauhaus as to a magnet; but to those who clung to the past, the Bauhaus was like a red rag." *Bauhaus 1919–1928,* ed. Herbert Bayer et al. (Boston: Branford, 1959). Despite the exhibition's success, there was still an undercurrent of Bauhaus criticism that Gropius had unjustly trivialized the American contribution to architectural modernism. See, for example, Harvey Watt's "Bauhaus Helotry," in *Art Digest,* 1 August 1939, pp. 26–28. The estimation of Wright as at best a precursor to the Bauhaus was a constant bone of contention among American architectural historians. See for example the heated exchange of letters in 1962 between Gropius and Vincent Scully, architecture historian at Yale University (Bauhaus-Archiv, Berlin).

47. Hartmut Frank, "Trümmer: Traditionelle und Moderne Architekten in Nachkriegsdeutschland," in *Grauzonen Farbwelten,* ed. Bernhard Schultz (Berlin: Medusa, 1983), pp. 43–84. Note as well Jeffry Diefendorf, "Berlin on the Charles, Cambridge on the Spree: Walter Gropius, Martin Wagner and the Rebuilding of Germany," in *Wechselbeziehungen im Exil—Exile Across Cultures,* ed. Helmut Pfanner (Bonn: Bouvier-Verlag, 1986), pp. 343–357.

48. It should be recalled, however, that Gropius did not preach any 1920s style radical modernism to postwar Germans, but instead recommended that Germans adopt a new plan of "therapeutic regionalism" for postwar planning. Arguing that the roots of Nazism lay in the deadly combination of uncontrolled technocracy, civic apathy, and a more general "Vermassung," Gropius suggested that postwar Germany ought to be reconstructed as a lattice of 5,000–8,000 person "neighborhood units." He believed that only such a model could cultivate the sense of individual initiative and social justice requisite for true democracy. Walter Gropius, "Bericht von Walter Gropius für

General Lucius D. Clay, den Militärgouverneur für Deutschland (U.S. Zone)," *Baurundschau* 9/10 (1948), pp. 76–78. And however much his ideas seemed strangely in concert with those of Tessenow and even Schwarz himself, Gropius' status as a U.S. government functionary alienated him from West German planners. Frank, p. 68; Diefendorf, pp. 348ff.

49. In one 25 August 1947 letter to Peter Hardnen, Information Control Officer of the United States Army, Gropius wrote: "From the point of view of progressive democratic education, I believe that a Bauhaus exhibition would be a constructive contribution to the cultural step-up of Germany. This exhibition, however, *should be done not from the historical point of view* but as a document for a growing movement the threads of which were cut off by Hitler and could be taken up again as a promising trend of progressive development in art and architecture" (emphasis added) (Bauhaus-Archiv, Berlin).

50. This was the published title of Gropius' collected speeches delivered during his 1954 world lecture tour as a Rockefeller Fellow. *Apollo in the Democracy* (New York: McGraw, 1968). For more on Gropius' political changes and sanitized (auto-)biography see Winfried Nerdinger, *Walter Gropius* (Berlin: Gebrüder Mann, 1985).

51. The marginalization of Mies van der Rohe from the larger Bauhaus hagiography began with the 1938 exhibition. In contrast to Gropius, Mies' work generally received independent treatment and was rarely framed by his experience at the Bauhaus, as noted in Philip Johnson, *Mies van der Rohe* (1953); Arthur Drexler, *Mies van der Rohe* (1960); and Werner Blaser, *Mies van der Rohe: The Art of Structure* (1965). Notably, Mies was practically forgotten amid the West German celebration of the Bauhaus.

52. For a good example of this style, see Reginald Isaac's two-volume biography, *Walter Gropius: Ein Mensch und sein Werk* (Berlin: Gebrüder Mann, 1983–1984). Portraits of Gropius as larger-than-life mythical figure were by no means confined to the United States. One South African biographer wrote: "He [Gropius] has reiterated order across the years with ever-increasing force, clarity, and urgency, as a divided world drifts to the brink of chaos. If we are ever to be rescued from the pit of disintegration, it will be through the synthetic vision of such men as Walter Gropius." Gilbert Herbert, *The Synthetic Vision of Walter Gropius* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University, 1959), p. 41.

53. Gropius' letter in response to Schwarz even concluded with a quotation from Goethe: "Laß dich nur zu keiner Zeit/ zum Widerspruch verleiten,/ Weise fallen in Unwissenheit/ Wenn sie mit Unwissenden streiten." *Die Neue Zeitung*, 11 April 1953.

54. *Hanauer Anzeiger*, 29 August 1961. Crucial in this regard in that this Gropius celebration took place against the postwar politicization of Goethe as the classic referent of (West) German humanist culture, as witnessed in such texts as Albert Erich Brinkmann's *Geist im Wandel* (1947), Friedrich Meinecke's *The German Catastrophe* (1948) as well as the rash of Goethe cults that cropped up during the 1950s. Hermand, pp. 69ff.

55. Barbara Miller Lane, *German Architecture and Politics, 1918–1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1968), esp. Chapter 3.

56. Gerhard Laage, "Goethe, Demokratie und das flache Dach," *Der Architekt,* no. 4 (1962), pp. 131–137.

57. "We ought to recall that Walter Gropius has definitely been elevated into the pantheon of heroes representing contemporary German culture; the Bauhaus pedagogic influence, especially its preparatory course, can be seen in all important art, architecture, and applied art schools in this country; the Bauhaus people occupy the most powerful positions in cultural and academic life here; and the feuilletons of the major West German newspapers endlessly publish articles about the Bauhaus or about the former Bauhaus teachers and students in Weimar, Dessau, or Berlin." Tomas Maldonado, "Is the Bauhaus Relevant Today?" *Ulm* 8/9 (September 1963), pp. 5–13 (translation modified).

58. This term, which informed much of the later literature, was first used by Hermann Mäckler in his two-page editorial response to Schwarz, *Baukunst und Werkform* (February 1953), pp. 65–66. The effort to instate Gropius instead of Mann is neatly articulated by Walter Schmiele, "Walter Gropius und das Goethe-Preis," *Hessischer Rundfunk,* 20 August 1961 (Bauhaus-Archiv, Berlin).

59. Much of Gropius' romanticism stemmed from his cherished belief in recouping the importance of Alois Riegl's forgotten *Kunstwollen* idea. For the centrality of Riegl's idea in Gropius' architectural philosophy, see Nerdinger's "Walter Gropius' Beitrag zur Architektur des 20. Jahrhunderts," in Hahn, pp. 17–36. Also, Marcel Franciscono, *Walter Gropius and the Creation of the Weimar Bauhaus* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1971).

60. Gropius, "Apollo in the Democracy," in *Apollo,* pp. 3–4.

61. Occasionally Gropius and the Bauhaus were cast as emblems of German *Kultur* and American Civilization at the same time. For instance, a 1962 Darmstadt exhibition entitled *Walter Gropius: Werk und Personlichkeit* emphasized his contribution to aesthetic education, whereas a Boston exhibition of the same year, "Walter Gropius: Ein Weg zur Einheit künstlerischer Gestaltung," foregrounded Gropius' philosophy of technology.

62. James Mellow, "The Bauhaus is Alive and Well in Soup Plates and Skyscrapers," *The New York Times Magazine,* 14 September 1969, pp. 34–38.

63. For a useful discussion of postwar trends, Werner Durth and Niels Gutschow, *Träume in Trümmern: Stadtplanung 1940–1950* (Munich: Taschenbuchverlag, 1993), esp. pp. 214–312.

64. This also could be seen in West German architectural historiography, as Wend Fischer's *Bau-Raum-Gerät* (1957), Jürgen Joedicke's *Geschichte der modernen Architektur* (1958), and Hans Wingler's *Das Bauhaus* (1962) perpetuated this American revision by rewriting Bauhaus history as a celebration of international architectural liberalism. No less noteworthy was that the Bauhaus Archive-Museum was founded in Darmstadt in 1961 as a tribute to its accrued postwar significance.

65. That these buildings were often conceived of by architects who had nothing to do with the historical Bauhaus—such as Hans Schwippert, Egon Eiermann, and Sep Ruf

—hardly mattered; the lay public still identified and welcomed this International Style as vintage Bauhaus. See for example the press coverage of the West German Pavilion at the 1958 Brussels World Exhibition in *Deutschlands Beitrag zur Weltausstellung: Ein Bericht,* ed. G.B. von Hartmann and Wend Fischer (Düsseldorf: Nordwestdeutsche Ausstellungs-Gesellschaft, 1958), pp. 95–153.

66. Thomas Hoscislawski, *Bauen zwischen Macht und Ohnmacht: Architektur und Städtebau in der DDR* (Berlin: Verlag für Bauwesen, 1991), pp. 38–43, 101–111, and 297–310. A documentary history of the official East German debates on the Bauhaus and modernism in general can be found in Andreas Schätzke, *Zwischen Bauhaus und Stalinallee: Architekturdiskussion im östlichen Deutschland, 1945–1955* (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1991).

67. The GDR rehabilitation of Meyer only began after the delayed rediscovery of this other more leftist Bauhaus in the late 1960s. Nerdinger, "Anstößiges Rot," in *Hannes Meyer,* pp. 12–29, as well as Heinz Hirdina, *Design in der DDR, 1949–1985* (Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 1985) and *Vom Bauhaus bis Bitterfeld: 41 Jahre DDR-Design,* ed. Regina Halter (Giessen: Anabas, 1991).

68. From the very beginning, the 1957 West Berlin INTERBAU exhibition, where 63 leading international architects (including Gropius, Le Corbusier, and Richard Niemeyer) were invited to design new housing for West Berlin's bombed-out Hansa quarter, was organized as political propaganda against the *Stalinallee* style of East Berlin. Dieter Hanauske, "Bauen! Bauen! Bauen! Die Wohnungspolitik in Berlin (West), 1945–1961," Ph.D. Dissertation, Freie Universität, Berlin (1990), pp. 598ff.

69. To be sure, this campaign was often not well received abroad. During his trip to Japan as part of his 1954 world tour as a Rockefeller fellow, for example, Gropius received severe criticism from Japanese journalists who condemned his "Organic Town Planning" model as nothing but thinly disguised Western cultural imperialism. Isaacs, pp. 1017ff.

70. For the standard discussion of modernization theory, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte* (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck und Ruprecht, 1973) as well as David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

71. Note the comments by Lauritz Lauritzen, Federal Minister of Housing and City Planning, at the opening of the 1968 Stuttgart Bauhaus Exposition, Bauhaus-Archiv, Berlin. Eugen Betz, West Germany's former Consul General, made the same points in his introduction to the English edition of the exhibition catalogue, *50 Years Bauhaus* (Chicago: IIT, 1969), pp. 7–8.

72. The exhibition's overemphasis on Gropius prompted many prominent Bauhaus members, including Josef Albers and Mies van der Rohe, to complain about this misleading image. Isaacs, pp. 1148ff.

73. Hans Wingler, "Was hält Amerika von deutscher Kunst?" *Die Welt,* 12 May 1958.

74. Durth, *Deutsche Architekten,* p. 446; Borngräber, p. 23.

75. Winfried Nerdinger, "Bauhaus-Architekten im 'Dritten Reich'," *Bauhaus-Moderne,*

pp. 153–178.

76. Among the numerous critiques are Heinrich Klotz, *Revision der Moderne* (Munich: Prestel, 1984); Klaus Herdeg, *The Decorated Diagram: Harvard Architecture and the Failure of the Bauhaus Legacy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984) and Brent Brolin, *The Failure of Modern Architecture* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1976). The formalist attacks were of course accompanied by numerous works challenging the normative narrative of Modernism such as Robert Venturi, *Complexity and Contradictions in Modern Architecture* (New York: MOMA, 1966); Kenneth Frampton, *Modern Architecture: A Critical History* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980); and Richard Pommer, "Revising Modernist History: The Architecture of the 1920s and 1930s," *Art Journal* 43 (Summer 1983). Revisionist biographies can be found in Elaine Hochman's *Architects of Fortune: Mies van der Rohe and the Third Reich* (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989) and Nerdinger's *Walter Gropius* (Berlin: Gebrüder Mann, 1985).

77. Michael Geyer, "Looking Back at the International Style: Some Reflections on the Current State of German History," *German Studies Review,* vol. 13, no. 1 (February 1990), pp. 112–127.

78. Wolfgang Mommsen, "The Germans and Their Past: History and Political Consciousness in the Federal Republic of Germany," in *Coping with the Past,* ed. Kathy Harms, Lutz Rentner, and Volker Dürr (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 252–268 and Charles Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German National Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

79. Examples include Wolfgang Benz's edited four-volume *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1983); Hermann Glaser's edited three-volume *Die Kulturgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1985–1989); *Die Identität der Deutschen,* ed. Werner Weidenfeld (Munich: C. Hanser, 1983); and Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1981–1983).

80. Benjamin Buchloh, "Figures of Authority, Ciphers of Aggression," *October* 16 (spring 1981), pp. 39–68; Anton Kaes, *From Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); and Richard Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past* (New York: Pantheon, 1989).

81. *Die Fünfziger Jahre: Beiträge zu Politik und Kultur,* ed. Dieter Bänisch (Tübingen: Günther Narr, 1985); *Grauzonen Farbwelten,* ed. Bernhard Schultz (Berlin, 1983); Götz Eisenberg and Hans-Jürgen Linke, *Fuffziger Jahre* (Giessen: Focus-Verlag, 1979); and Nikolaus Jungwirth and Gerhard Kronschröder, *Die Pubertät der Republik* (Frankfurt: Dieter Fricke, 1978).

82. David Crew, "*Alltagsgeschichte:* A New Social History 'from Below'?" *Central European History,* vol 22, no. 3/4 (Sept/December 1989), pp. 394–407.

83. See Borngräber, esp. the Introduction; Selle, pp. 241–273; as well as Albrecht Bangert, *Der Stil der 50er Jahre* (Munich: Wilhelm Heyne, 1983).